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Este trabalho discute a evolução da defesa da concorrência no Brasil a partir de uma 
perspectiva histórica e comparada. Para tanto, primeiramente são apresentadas as transformações 
estruturais da economia brasileira assim como as circunstâncias internacionais que fizeram com 
que a defesa da concorrência se tornasse relevante, o que permite fazer um contraste com a 
evolução de outros regimes de concorrência. Em segundo lugar, são apresentados os desafios e as 
peculiaridades da implementação da defesa da concorrência em uma economia em 
desenvolvimento e como tais desafios foram tratados no caso brasileiro. A principal conclusão é 
que as “melhores práticas” dos países do OCDE não podem ser automaticamente importadas sem 
a devida atenção às peculiaridades de uma economia em desenvolvimento. 
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ABSTRACT 
This paper discusses the evolution of competition policy in Brazil from a historical and 
comparative perspective. First, the structural transformations of the Brazilian economy as well as 
the international circumstances which made competition policy relevant are presented, which 
permits a contrast with the evolution of other competition regimes. Second, the challenges and 
peculiarities of implementing competition policy in a developing economy and how such 
challenges were coped with in the Brazilian case are presented. The major conclusion is that best 
practices in the OECD countries cannot be automatically imported without due attention to the 
peculiarities of a developing economy.  
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1 1    I In nt tr ro od du uc ct ti io on n   
The purpose of this article is to discuss the evolution of competition policy in Brazil from 
a historical and comparative perspective. In contrast with the experience of various OECD 
countries and the United States in particular, competition policy has only recently become 
relevant in Brazil. Its increasing importance for public policy has not been preceded by a gradual 
development of competition culture and institutions. This fact has several implications for policy 
making. Best practices in the OECD countries cannot be automatically imported without due 
attention to the peculiarities of a developing economy.  
The paper is divided in five sections, including this introduction. Section 2 underlines the 
structural transformations of the Brazilian economy as well as the international circumstances 
which made competition policy relevant. This permits a contrast with the evolution of other 
competition regimes. Section 3 describes the different phases of competition policy in Brazil. 
Section 4 discusses the challenges and peculiarities of implementing competition policy in a 
developing economy. Section 5 describes how such challenges were coped with in the Brazilian 
case. A final section contains the major conclusions. 
2 2    S St tr ru uc ct tu ur ra al l   r re ef fo or rm ms s   a an nd d   s st ta ab bi il li iz za at ti io on n: :   t th he e   p pr re ec co on nd di it ti io on ns s   f fo or r   a an n   
a ac ct ti iv ve e   c co om mp pe et ti it ti io on n   p po ol li ic cy y   i in n   B Br ra az zi il l
1 1   
The motivation for implementing competition policy in Brazil has been totally different 
from the cases of the U.S., E.U. and other developed jurisdictions. As in many other developing 
economies, competition policy has not been a consequence of the natural evolution of a market 
economy. Initially it was an instrument to disseminate market institutions after decades of import 
substitution during which the state played a predominant role in capital accumulation. In the U.S., 
                                                 
1 Sections 2 and 3 rely heavily on Oliveira & Fujiwara (2006), forthcoming in Northwestern Journal of 
International Law & Business.  
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competition policy was a natural outcome of the market economy. In Brazil it has been conceived 
as a policy input to strengthen market institutions. Chart 1 summarizes the evolution of 
competition policy in Brazil. 
Chart 1: Evolution of the competition policy in Brazil 
 
Source: various documents and legal texts 
Although Brazilian competition legislation dates back to the thirties, its implementation 
did not become relevant until the mid-nineties. Under the import-substitution model, the 
Brazilian state intervened in a number of sectors in order to induce industrialization. In addition 
to the prominent presence of the state, the model was also characterized as a closed economy 
producing mainly for the domestic market. On the basis of this structure, the Brazilian economy 
showed high growth rates that were sustained until the mid-seventies.  
After the oil shock, however, this model presented several limitations due to lack of 
external funds and a fiscal crisis of the Brazilian state. In the period 1980-89, the annual growth 
rate fell to 1%, well below the average of 7% sustained during the period 1970-79.
2 By the 
eighties inflation had already soared to triple digits and in 1989-90 Brazil experienced 
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hyperinflation.
3 These factors, combined with falling productivity in the state sector, led to major 
changes in the policy regime. 
Five changes in particular explain the increasing importance of competition policy. The 
first change was represented by trade liberalization. This process had been initiated under the 
Sarney administration (1985-89) but was accelerated by the Industrial & Trade Policy (PICE) 
introduced during Collor’s term (1990-92). Trade liberalization was a relatively gradual process. 
Chart 2 shows the decline in import tariffs. The Industrial & Trade Policy eliminated special 
import regimes and reduced non-tariff barriers. The average import tariff dropped from 57.5% in 
1987 to 13.4% in 1998, while the maximum tariff dropped from over 100% to 38.1% in the same 
period.
4 
Chart 2: Evolution of the import tariff rate  
Source: WTO, Silber (2002) and Kume et al. (2000) 
Second, privatization reduced direct state intervention. Federal Law 8031/90
5 enacted the 
privatization program, which began the process of reducing direct state intervention in the 
economy. Some companies were privatized during the eighties but this did not produce a major 
change in the size of the state. The enterprises privatized during that period had been acquired by 
                                                 
3 The average annual inflation rate in the eighties was 237%. Inflation reached 1,783% and 1,477% in 1989 
and 1990 respectively.  
4 See Kume et al. (2000).  
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the state owing to financial difficulties, and their privatization simply meant resale to the private 
sector. The total value of these transactions was relatively small: US$780 million.  
The privatization program was accelerated by the Collor administration and continued 
under Itamar Franco. During these two administrations (1991-94) the program focused on 
privatizing enterprises in steel, petrochemicals and fertilizers that did not require major regulatory 
changes. Receipts from privatization totaled US$8.6 billion. 
In the following period, under the first Cardoso administration (1995-98), the program 
comprised the sale of the state-owned enterprises most directly active in infrastructure sectors 
such as telecommunications, electricity and railroads. Receipts totaled US$86.9 billion, of which 
US$70.3 billion corresponded to actual revenue from sales.
6 Given the importance of this 
program and the elements of natural monopoly involved in many of the affected markets, 
regulatory issues became central to the public policy agenda. 
Thus the third change had to do with regulation. As part of the infrastructure was 
privatized, it became clear that the state would have to design specific regulatory frameworks. 
Brazil already had some government agencies with regulatory powers,
7 but they did not have the 
same characteristics as the bodies created in the second half of the nineties as part of the process 
of transforming the role of the state in the economic sphere. In this context, competition 
authorities became important to complement the process and interact with the regulatory 
agencies. Note that in the U.S. many regulatory agencies preceded the antitrust authorities. In 
contrast, in Brazil they were created after a competition law was in place.
8 Antitrust bodies were 
the ones with certain expertise to deal with the vertical and horizontal problems which typically 
arise in regulated industries. 
Another interesting contrast relates to the role of subnational governments. In the U.S. the 
states were active in regulation. In Brazil the initiative was mainly federal. A few Brazilian states 
                                                 
6 See Oliveira (1996, pp. 88-92). 
7 Such as the Central Bank (BACEN), created by Law No. 4595, December 31, 1964, the Private Insurance  
Superintendency (SUSEP), created by Law No. 73, November 21, 1966, or the Securities & Exchange 
Commission (CVM), created by Law No. 6385, December 7, 1976. 
8 See Viscusi, Vernon & Harrington Jr. (1995).  
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followed suit in the areas where they had powers to grant concessions, such as in natural gas and 
roads.  
The fourth change was stabilization. Indeed, when inflation was high and accelerating 
after the late seventies, there was no room for microeconomic policies. Concerns with 
deadweight losses seemed superfluous when prices were rising at more than 20%-30% per 
month.
9  
Indeed, inflation became the main concern after the mid-eighties. A dozen stabilization 
plans were implemented between 1986 and the Real Plan in 1994. Coordination of inflationary 
expectations through monetary reform, use of the exchange rate as a nominal anchor and some 
effort to control the fiscal accounts succeeded in lowering the inflation rate. Inflation averaged 
8.17% in the period 1995-2005. Most forecasts point to single-digit levels for the next few 
years.
10  
The fifth change related to the international environment. In different forms, competition 
policy became more important among policy recommendations. UNCTAD had always been 
active in disseminating competition issues in developing countries. The World Bank prescribed 
competition during the eighties as one of the conditionality requirements for structural adjustment 
loans. Competition was also included as one of the Singapore Ministerial issues in 1996 and a 
working group on trade and competition was created at the World Trade Organization (WTO).
11 
This group was very active until the Cancun meeting in 2001 when competition was no longer a 
negotiation item in the Doha Round. Finally, the creation of different multilateral fora such as the 
International Competition Network (http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org) or the 
Global Competition Forum (http://www.globalcompetitionforum.org) stimulated the adoption of 
national competition laws as well as emulation of so-called “best practices” derived from 
international experience.  
                                                 
9 See footnote 3 above. 
10 Source: Getúlio Vargas Foundation. 
11For information on WTO actions relating to competition policy, see the WTO website 
(http://www.wto.org/english/ tratop_e/comp_e/comp_e.htm).  
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The roles and characteristics of competition policy have varied according to the stage of 
development of a particular country. In the case of Brazil, competition policy became relevant 
only in the context of a more open and market economy in the late twentieth century. The next 
section provides more details about the evolution of competition policy in Brazil. 
3 3    T Th he e   t th hr re ee e   p ph ha as se es s   o of f   B Br ra az zi il li ia an n   c co om mp pe et ti it ti io on n   p po ol li ic cy y   
Three phases of competition policy in Brazil can be identified, as indicated in Chart 1 
above. Chart 3 contains a list of the relevant legislation. The division is, of course, arbitrary. A 
few competition cases occurred even when the policy regime was characterized by strong state 
intervention, while the traits and vices of interventionism persisted after a more modern 
competition law had been put in place. Chart 4 sums up the historical development of Brazil’s 
competition legislation. 
The first phase extends from enactment of the 1937 Constitution under the Vargas 
dictatorship to the 1988 Constitution when the first steps towards a more open economy were 
taken.
12 This phase was characterized by a high degree of state intervention in the economy and a 
marginal role for competition policy. Indeed, during import substitution, in which the state played 
a crucial role in production and intervened directly in the markets, antitrust was not important at 
all. 
During this first phase, there was no competition legislation in Brazil. Instead of market 
protection, several initiatives aimed at providing instruments for the state to intervene. Market 
protection in reality meant the legal possibility of state intervention.  
Note that despite the difficulties of implementing competition in this phase, a more 
modern competition law was enacted in 1962.
13 A national competition authority, Conselho 
Administrativo de Defesa Econômica (CADE), was created the same year.
14 The number of cases 
                                                 
12 The 1988 Constitution is seriously defective in respect of macro policy and fiscal equilibrium but laid the 
legal foundations for a more regulatory and less interventionist role of the state in the economy. 
13 Law No. 4137, October 9, 1962. 
14 Law No. 4137, October 9, 1962.  
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brought before CADE in the following three decades was relatively small, as shown in Section 5 
below. But even this limited activity fostered the rise of certain professional circles dedicated to 
antitrust in a few major cities.
15 Nevertheless, CADE was not involved in policy making. The 
state sector remained dominant and most markets were under some kind of direct or indirect 
government control. The price control bodies Conselho Interministerial de Preços (CIP) and 
Superintendência Nacional de Abastecimento e Preços (SUNAB) had much more power than 
CADE. 
The second phase started in the late eighties. The 1988 Constitution recognized the central 
role of the private sector and the first trade liberalization measures were introduced.
16 However, 
many sectors of the economy were still under direct government control and price controls were 
not totally eliminated. This phase therefore marks a transition period.  
The transition was characterized by a change of direction to a more open economy with 
greater exposure to the world economy and less state intervention in comparison with the import 
substitution period.
17 This process of structural transformation brought about several other 
changes and made the previous price control system obsolete.
18  
Another feature of this phase was the continuing macroeconomic crisis represented by 
hyperinflation. For an indexed economy like Brazil’s to achieve stability, a specific strategy was 
necessary to coordinate economic agents so as to reduce the extremely high rate of inflation to a 
single-digit annual rate. Thus some kind of coordination mechanism was needed as part of the 
new policy regime. This explains why it took some time to eliminate the price control bodies. On 
the contrary, in fact, the government created a secretariat linked to the central administration (the 
National Economic Law Secretariat, local acronym SNDE, later renamed SDE) in 1990 and also 
                                                 
15 Farina (1990) pioneered in discussing the economic aspects of the early CADE experience. IBRACC 
documents and various other publications reveal that a few scholars and professionals became active in São 
Paulo, Rio de Janeiro, Belo Horizonte and Porto Alegre in the seventies and eighties. 
16 Between 1988 and 1989, the average import tariff fell from 51% to 34%, and import procedures were 
simplified with the reduction of some non-tariff barriers and the unification of some import taxes (Averbug, 
1999, p. 46). 
17 See, for example, Oliveira &Turolla (2004). 
18 Oliveira (1996).   
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resisted immediate extinction of the price monitoring agencies.
19 Reluctance to eliminate old 
bureaucratic functions is usually attributed exclusively to lobbying and political resistance on the 
part of the bureaucracy. Such resistance in fact occurred in the Brazilian case, but there was an 
additional reason for the gradual phasing out of the old price control regime.
20 
It became clear that the state would not be able to continue to lead the investment and 
production process because of the profound fiscal crisis that characterized this period. The 
economy was ravaged by hyperinflation in 1989-90. After a series of failed attempts at 
stabilization, the 1994 Real Plan finally stamped out hyperinflation.
21 
Thus the third phase begins with the success of this stabilization program, the Real Plan, 
prepared in 1993-94. Law 8884 of June 1994 was a landmark in this transformation. Curiously, 
the political motivation for Law 8884 drew inspiration from the notion of state intervention in the 
market, inherited from previous stages. President Itamar Franco hoped the law would permit fast 
punishment of price abuses in the pharmaceutical sector and demanded approval of what became 
the new competition law as a condition for implementing the stabilization plan.
22 
Law 8884 introduced three major changes. First, it gave more power to a technical body, 
CADE, which was made the last instance at the administrative level, i.e. without appeal to any 
other body in the Executive branch. Second, it transformed CADE into an independent council 
whose members served a fixed term for the first time (two years). Third, it introduced merger 
control.
23 
Chart 3: The Three Phases of Competition Policy in Brazil 
Law  Date  Reference to the  Governmental body 
                                                 
19 Conselho Ministerial de Preços was extinguished in 1990 but the popular Superintendência Nacional de 
Preços e Abastecimento (SUNAB) persisted until 1997. 
20 Oliveira (1996, pp. 59-73) discusses price policy in this phase of the transition. 
21 Among others, Oliveira (1996, Section II) discusses the implementation of the Real Plan. 
22  Based on informal reports from different sources in the Brazilian government at the time of the 
elaboration of the Real Plan. 
23 Article 54 of Law 8884 retained part of the structure of art. 13 of Law 8158/91, which in turn was taken 
over from art. 74 of Law 4137 (1962). The changes of Law 8884/94 may seem trivial nowadays. But at the 
time they generated considerable resistance. The fact that a brilliant and liberal economist, Mário Henrique 
Simonsen, considered the law a major threat to capitalism gives an idea of how the country lacked familiarity 
with competition culture and legislation.  
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LD 869  11/18/38  FC 1937, art. 141   
LD nº 7,666 
"Malaia Law"  06/22/45   Comission for economic 
defence (CADE) 
Law nº 1,521  12/26/51     
Law nº 1,522  12/26/51    Federal Price and    Supply 
Commission (COFAP) 
Law nº 4,137  09/10/62  FC 1946, art. 148  (CADE) 
Law nº 4  09/26/62  FC 1946, art. 146  National Supply 
Superintendence (SUNAB) 
LD nº 52,025  05/20/63  Law nº 4137   
Decree nº 
63,196  08/29/68  FC 1967, art. 83, II 
Repealed in 04/25/91 
Price Inter State Department 
Commission (CIP) 
LD nº 92,323  01/23/86  Repeals DL 52,025 
Regulates  4,137 law   
Transition Phase 
1988 
Constitution      
Law nº 8,137  12/02/90  FC 1988,  
art. 170 and 173   
LD nº 99,244  05/10/90  FC 1988,  
art. 170 and 173  SNDE 
Law nº 8,158  
(PM 204/90)  01/09/91  FC 1988,  
art. 170 and 173  SDE 
Open economy 
Law nº 8,884  06/11/94  FC 1988,  
art. 170 and 173  CADE becomes an autarchy 
Law nº 9,021  03/30/95  FC 1988,  
art. 170 and 173   
Law nº 9,069  06/29/95  FC 1988,  
art. 170 and 173   
Law nº 9,470  07/10/97  FC 1988,  
art. 170 and 173   
Resolution nº 15  08/19/98  FC 1988,  
art. 170 and 173  CADE 
Resolution nº 20  06/03/99  FC 1988,  
art. 170 and 173  CADE 
PM nº 2,055  08/11/00  FC 1988,  
art. 170 and 173  SEAE/SDE/CADE 
PM nº 2,056  08/11/00  FC 1988,  
art. 170 and 173 
SEAE/SDE/CADE/ 
ANP 
Law nº 10,149  12/21/00  FC 1988,  
Art. 170 and 173  SEAE/SDE/CADE 
Ordinance 50 of 
2001  08/01/01  FC 1988,  
Art. 170 and 173  SEAE/SDE 
Resolution nº 28  07/24/02  FC 1988,  
art. 170 and 173  CADE  
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Joint Ordinance 
nº 1  02/18/03  FC 1988,  
art. 170 and 173  SEAE/SDE/CADE 
SDE Ordinance 
nº 4  01/05/06  FC 1988,  
art. 170 and 173  SDE 
Source: various documents and legal texts. 
Chart 4: Evolution of Antitrust Legislation in Brazil 























Source: various documents and legal texts. 
Several provisions of Law 8884 were designed to promote competition. For example, 
CADE is charged with “instructing the public on the forms of infringement of the economic 
order.”
24 However, a careful analysis shows the need for enhancements in case preparation and 
merger control, less bureaucracy and more transparency, and swifter decision making. 
In conclusion, the Brazilian economy experienced profound changes after the late 
eighties. It was opened up to international goods and capital inflows. Direct state intervention in 
production was replaced by regulation. Price controls aimed at combating high inflation were 
replaced by competition policy. These changes should have placed competition policy at the 
center of public policy. However, the usual obstacles to effective implementation of competition 
policy tend to be even more severe in a developing country, as the following section shows. 
                                                 
24 From article 7, clause XVIII, of Law 8884 (1994), itself a minor amendment to art. 17, subclause (r), of 
Law 4137 (1962).  
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4 4    C Ch ha al ll le en ng ge es s   a an nd d   p pe ec cu ul li ia ar ri it ti ie es s   o of f   i im mp pl le em me en nt ti in ng g   c co om mp pe et ti it ti io on n   
p po ol li ic cy y   i in n   d de ev ve el lo op pi in ng g   e ec co on no om mi ie es s   
Seven peculiarities of developing economies require technical attention when 
implementing competition law. In econometric language, there is no need for a new structural 
model, but the parameters are significantly different. Generally speaking competition problems in 
developing countries are more severe and authorities have fewer resources to cope with them. 
First, the large informal sector has important implications. Chart 5 puts the Brazilian 
informal sector in comparative perspective. Widespread informality creates dual markets in 
several sectors and this may distort the analysis of formal markets on which competition 
authorities focus. Three consequences for antitrust analysis are especially pertinent: 
The market power of dominant formal firms may be overestimated owing to 
underestimation of the price elasticity of demand.  
Additional noise in price information makes cartels more unstable and cartel analysis even 
more difficult.  
Predatory pricing analysis may involve reviewing a broader set of policies and in 
particular examining the ways in which imperfect enforcement of the legislation may distort 
competition. 
It is important to be clear about the definition of the informal sector which is relevant at 
this point. The informal sector is defined here as a segment of the economy where there is 
sufficiently high degree of non compliance with the various types of legislation in order to affect 
relative prices in the market. It is different from the informal sector discussed in part of the 






                                                 
25 A more rigorous definition in line with this concept has benn proposed by Guedes and Ferres (2006).  
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Source: World Bank 
 
Second, the size of the market matters in antitrust analysis. As a medium-sized economy 
with many prominent multinational corporations, Brazil has been affected by cross-border 
mergers and international cartels. The Kolynos-Colgate case in 1996 and the more recent vitamin 
cartel are illustrative. This requires cooperation with other national competition authorities. 
Another consequence of a relatively smaller market is the tendency for concentration ratios to be 
higher in most relevant markets. Moreover, in liberalized markets whole sectors may have to be 
consolidated in order to gain economies of scale. 
Third, the transition toward a more liberalized economy has implications for the order of 
magnitude of the efficiencies that can be obtained through mergers. In mature economies 
authorities tend to be skeptical about the magnitude of such efficiencies, whereas for developing 
economies with a history of significant inefficiencies due to price control and other distortions, 
certain transactions may offer very large efficiency gains. The merger between the two largest 
Brazilian breweries which led to the creation of Ambev in 1999 is illustrative. 
Fourth, the infrastructure is precarious, as illustrated in Chart 6. Few firms have access to 
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Note:  Evaluation criteria: Regulatory paradigm, legal matters, taxation, institutional matters and 
investment level. Based on a sample of interviews conducted by the Brazilian business publication Exame. 
 
Fifth, higher transaction costs prevent new firms from contesting quasi-monopolies. 
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Source: World Bank 
The combination of the above two characteristics – precarious infra-structure and higher 
transaction costs – leads to higher entry barriers and severe difficulties in reallocating resources 
in the economy. Even after trade liberalization, several input prices show little degree of 
sensitivity to international prices. Econometric evidence for segments of fertilizer markets is 
revealing.  
Sixth, unlike mature economies, developing economies lack a competition culture. 
Markets and market institutions are in the process of being created. This is one of the reasons 
competition advocacy becomes crucial in these countries
26.  
Seventh, political market failure is more severe in developing economies. Relatively new 
and fragile agencies have to fight for a share of the budget to enforce laws that may erode the 
power of vested interests. In contrast with trade policy, no specific groups will benefit from 
successful antitrust enforcement whereas gains will be diffused among millions of consumers. 
Constituencies to support active competition policy are conspicuous by their absence. Disputes 
over CADE cases  very often reflect private interests, rather than public competition concerns. In 
                                                 
26 See, for example, Kovacic (1997) and Oliveira (2001). 
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contrast with consumer protection, competition issues are often distant from the consumer’s 
experience. It is no small task to show how certain cases of abuse of market power in 
intermediary and capital goods will eventually affect the final consumer. Thus it is not surprising 
that almost all political parties have given little attention to competition policy in a context of 
pressing social problems, poverty and inequality.  
In sum, developing countries have more competition problems and fewer resources. The 
next section illustrates how such difficulties have been dealt with in the Brazilian case.  
5 5    C Ch ha al ll le en ng ge es s   a an nd d   p pe ec cu ul li ia ar ri it ti ie es s   o of f   i im mp pl le em me en nt ti in ng g   c co om mp pe et ti it ti io on n   
p po ol li ic cy y   i in n   d de ev ve el lo op pi in ng g   e ec co on no om mi ie es s: :   t th he e   B Br ra az zi il li ia an n   l le ea ar rn ni in ng g   c cu ur rv ve e      
In contrast to most emerging countries, Brazil had early experience with competition 
policy. CADE has acquired a certain tradition since its creation in 1962 (Law 4137),
27 although it 
became much more active only after 1994 when the present legislation was approved. As shown 
by Chart 8, the evolution of CADE’s caseload is illustrative: the number of cases adjudicated per 
month averaged just over 1 until the beginning of the nineties, increasing to 55.8 in 2001-03. 
One of the important lessons of the reforms of the nineties is that the results do not appear 
immediately after the formal enactment of the new legislation. Success of a new legislation 
depends on a whole set of new procedures which have to be developed by a group of civil 
servants and a new professional community who have understood the spirit of the new legislation 






                                                 
27 See Farina (1990) for a discussion of Brazilian competition policy before the nineties.  
 
 
TEXTO PARA DISCUSSÃO 150   •   MAIO DE 2006   •   18 








Source: CADE and Farina (1990) 
CADE’s decisions on mergers and acquisitions, such as the rulings on Colgate-Kolynos in 
1996, AmBev in 2000 and Nestlé-Garoto in 2004 have increased its visibility. This did not 
necessarily result from a decision on the part of the authority to prioritize mergers to the 
detriment of other practices, notably cartels. 
The relative importance of merger cases in the nineties had to do with three factors:  
a sharp increase in cross-border mergers affecting developing countries and as a form of 
foreign direct investment;  
the time taken to eliminate the backlog of conduct cases inherited from the old price 
control period and develop new investigative tools against cartels; 
excessive control by the state of all transactions of the private sector. 
The debate on whether conduct control is more or less important than merger control has 
no real content. The goal should be to balance the various fronts on which an antitrust agency 
operates at each stage of institutional development. If the agency were perpetually restricted to 
conduct control, the formation of non-competitive market structures would increase the 
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hand, prioritizing merger control and neglecting conduct control would contradict the reason for 
controlling mergers in the first place, which is to prevent the abuse of economic power.  
Indeed, the challenge is to achieve a proper balance between these two fronts while also 
achieving productivity gains so that this can be done with the limited budget available. The next 
two subsections discuss how the two areas evolved in Brazil.  
5.1  Conduct control: settling accounts with the past, prevalence of the rule 
of reason, and recent anticartel activity 
The application of the usual concepts of antitrust in a developing economy is not a trivial 
matter. This is particularly true with anticartel activity which requires specific investigative 
techniques and well-designed incentives to get cooperation from the private sector. 
Conduct cases accounted for a majority of the total brought before CADE in the initial 
period following the passage of Law 8884. However, it is frequently argued that most cases 
related to past proceedings and ended up being set aside for lack of detailed information or 
arguments.
28 Chart 9 shows the procedure used for consideration of conduct cases. 







Source: Law nº 8884/94 
                                                 
28 It is also argued that the main sources of case law continue to be rulings on acts of concentration. This is 
only partially true, as shown in the chapter on case law in CADE’s 1997 Annual Report. 
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However, the fact that most cases were held invalid and set aside represented a necessary 
step to eliminate uncertainty for the private sector. As discussed above, the circumstances of 
industrialization in Brazil created an environment in which government played a key role in 
controlling prices and market outcomes. Thus as more rigorous criteria began to be applied to 
antitrust analysis, it was only natural that a large proportion of cases should be dismissed. Indeed, 
this was a positive development because it relieved the private sector of the burden of pending 
administrative cases not supported by modern antitrust legislation.  
Despite the slim chances of a verdict, these pending cases incur administrative costs, 
increase uncertainty, and have a negative impact on the reputation of the company involved and 
hence on its net asset value. Thus clearing the backlog reduces legal costs and risks, and enhances 
the security of capital as well as the return on capital, with positive effects on investment.
29  
After this early phase, improvements had to be made in order to combat anticompetitive 
practices. First, CADE Resolution 20 (1999) contained an initial set of guidelines for dealing 
with various types of misconduct. Basic information of this kind was important after decades of 
price control and no repression of illegal business agreements.
30 
Second, the Resolution confirmed the interpretation that there is no such thing as a “per 
se” infringement in Brazilian law. Both vertical and horizontal practices must be analyzed case 
by case, taking into consideration not only the costs resulting from the impact, but also the 
possible efficiencies arising from the event, so as to arrive at the net effects on the market and on 
the consumer.
31 
Third, Law 10,149 of 2000 provided important new instruments for conduct control.
32 It 
permitted the creation of a leniency program, which has proved useful in cartel enforcement, both 
in Brazil and other countries. It also gave powers to SDE to conduct inspections and dawn raids.  
The new legal instruments permitted a number of initiatives on the part of the competition 
authorities. SDE created an antitrust compliance program; a few leniency agreements were sealed 
                                                 
29 See Salgado (2004). 
30 As discussed above in Sections 2 and 3.  
31 Appendix to CADE Resolution 20 (June 9, 1999). 
32 Law 10,149 (December 21, 2000).  
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for the first time; and more important, a number of investigations of cartel activity were 
conducted. CADE decided on several cartel cases which have provided some guiding principles 
to the private sector. Chart 10 presents CADE’s decisions in conduct cases for the period 2000-
05. 
Chart 10: CADE decisions in conduct cases 2000-2005 
Year  Cases Decided  No violation Violation 
         Horizontal  Abuse of Dominance  Total 
2000  39  26  2  11  13 
2001  34  18  16  0  16 
2002  34  22  11  1  12 
2003  23  13  9  1  10 
2004  42  24  16  2  18 
2005  63  37  -  -  25 
Total  235  140  54  15  94 
Source: IDB-OCDE (2005) and Cade 
5.2  Merger control  
Merger control by antitrust agencies is a common practice in mature countries and has 
been gaining importance in emerging economies. Significant growth in the caseload during the 
nineties reflected reorganization of the Brazilian economy, as well as the old mentality of 
excessive control by the state of all transactions of the private sector. As with the case of conduct 
control, there was a learning period during which authorities improved their operational 
procedures and a new mentality replaced the old interventionist view. 
The following aspects should be highlighted: (i) low rate of rejection of transactions 
submitted to CADE, with a declining rate of intervention in the transactions examined; (ii) 
absence of bias against foreign capital; (iii) de-bureaucratization of case preparation and 
procedures; (iv) development of basic criteria for merger review, including the issuance of 
guidelines for horizontal mergers in 1999-2000.  
As in most jurisdictions, the percentage of cases in which conditions were imposed was 
small in Brazil. Experience with merger review led to an effort to reduce the bureaucratic burden 
on the private sector. At the outset, most approvals were accompanied by performance 
undertakings under article 58 of Law 8884. This changed after 1996. Mergers may now be  
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approved by CADE as long as they do not have anti-competitive effects. In the period 1994-96, 
the notion had prevailed that in all cases approval of a transaction required a conclusion that it 
added efficiencies. Chart 11 summarizes the procedures involved.  
As noted above, the cost of merger control can be high immediately after its introduction, 
when there is usually a lack of trained staff and competition culture. Because of this problem, 
changes were made to procedures to ensure that the analysis of acts of concentration produced 
faster and clearer results, and that simple cases would be treated differently from complex cases. 
Resolutions 1/95 and 5/96, and subsequently Resolution 15/98, were steps in this direction 
because (i) they created a simplified procedure for analysis, and (ii) they integrated and 
coordinated CADE’s activities with those of other governmental bodies with legal attributions in 
this area: SDE (the Justice Ministry’s Economic Law Secretariat) and SEAE (the Finance 
Ministry’s Economic Surveillance Secretariat).
33 












Source: Law 8884/94 
                                                 
33 CADE Resolution 1 ( May 21, 1992); Resolution 5 (August 28, 1996); Resolution 15 (August 19, 1998).  
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Article 54 of Law 8884 (1994) called for regulation to establish the universe and format 
of the information to be provided by economic agents.
34 The aim was to allow an analysis of 
market costs and benefits associated with an act of concentration. More recently, summary 
proceedings have been introduced.
35 
The situation improved with the application of Resolutions 5/96 and 15/98, although 
further changes were still necessary.
36 To these factors was added the peculiarity of Law No. 
8884 which allows for “a posteriori notification”,
37 so that applicants may (and in most cases do) 
carry out a transaction and only then submit it for approval to CADE. The longer CADE takes to 
rule on a case, the more adverse the effects of this provision, because:  
any negative effects on competition caused by the transaction will tend to become more 
concrete while the transaction is under analysis;  
the cost of any divestment will be higher owing to the need to undo a growing group of 
transactions derived from the original transaction;  
it increases legal uncertainty for the private sector.  
Important changes were introduced in the wake of the experience of the Ambev case. 
CADE’s Resolution n. 28 introduced two mechanisms to suspend the consummation of the 
transaction: the “precautionary order” and the “Agreement to Preserve the Reversibility of the 
Transaction” (local acronym APRO). Both this instruments prohibits the merging parties to make 
irreversible actions in order to conclude the merger. The main difference between them is that, 
while the “precautionary order” is imposed by CADE (being issued ex officio or in response to a 
petition by SEAE, SDE, CADE’s Attorney General or a third party), the APRO constitutes a 
consensual agreement between CADE and the merging parties and it was, from among these two 
mechanisms, the most used procedure henceforth. 
                                                 
34 Law 8884 (May 11, 1994). 
35 Article 16, CADE Resolution 12 (May 31, 1998). 
36 CADE Resolution 5 (August 28, 1996); Resolution 15 (August 19, 1998). 
37 Law 8884 (May 11, 1994).  
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In addition, the introduction of a fast track procedure by SDE and SEAE to the analysis of 
acts that clearly have no impact on competition
38 lowered the amount of time necessary for the 
judgment of these cases.  
 
More recently, a debate about the reinterpretation of the meaning of the threshold has 
taken place in Brazil. The present threshold, which is a total annual turnover of R$ 400 million, 
has been widely criticized. CADE changed its earlier interpretation that the amount would refer 
to total sales in the world and not only to the Brazilian market.
39 
Moreover the proposed bill to reform the competition law proposes to diminish the 
threshold to R$ 150 million and requires that the other part be a business of R$ 30 million at 
least. However, some exercises show that such criterion can increase and not diminish the 
number of cases and consequently increase the workload of competition agencies.
40 
Chart 12 presents CADE’s decisions in merger cases for the period 2000-05. 
Chart 12: CADE determination in merger cases 2000-2005 
      Approved  Approved with conditions    
Year  Transaction  Without  Disapproved 
   Reviewed  Conditions 
Structural  Ancillary  Total 
  
2005  497  449  -  -  48  0 
2004  618  574  2  41  43  1 
2003  491  484  1  6  7  0 
2002  485  474  0  11  11  0 
2001  571  559  0  12  12  0 
2000  507  490  1  14  15  2 
Total  3169  3030  4  84  136  3 
                                                 
38 Such as (1) the purchase of franchisees by their franchisors, (2) cooperative joint ventures created to enter 
a new market, (3) corporate restructuring within a single business group that entails no change in control, 
(4) acquisition of a Brazilian firm by a foreign firm that has no (or insignificant) business interests in Brazil, 
(4) acquisition of a foreign firm that no (or insignificant) business interests in Brazil by a Brazilian firm, (6) 
replacement of an economic agent where the acquiring firm did not previously participate substantially in 
the target market or in vertically–related markets, and (7) acquisition of a firm with a market share small 
enough to be unquestionably irrelevant with respect to competition. See SEAE/SDE Joint Ordiance n. 1, of 
February, 2003 and IDB-OCDE (2005) for more details.  
39 See CADE´s decision on ADC Telecommunications Inc. and Krone International Holding Inc.of January 
19, 2005. 
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Source: IDB-OCDE (2005) and Cade 
5.3  Prospects for competition policy in Brazil 
Almost 12 years after Law 8884 was passed, it is possible to suggest a modest reform 
agenda. Indeed, a bill is currently before Congress for that purpose. The main feature is the 
reduction of bureaucracy. The three antitrust bodies would be reduced to two, CADE and SEAE, 
with SDE regulating consumer protection. Only CADE would investigate, prepare and adjudicate 
cases. SEAE would be in charge of the interaction between competition policy, regulatory 
agencies and competition promotion.  
 Chart 13 shows the changes proposed by the bill to the current competition law. 
Chart 13: Competition law in historical perspective 
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Source: various documents and legal texts. 
Another important instrument proposed by the bill is the possibility of pre-merger review. 
This could reduce transaction costs in principle, but if the decision-making process remains slow, 
pre-merger review could end up blocking important economic outcomes. The bill also gives 
CADE commissioners a longer term (four years instead of two) and stipulates that it is not to be 
concurrent with the president’s term. Both changes should increase its autonomy. However, the  
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bill still lacks greater attention to the peculiarities of developing economies mentioned in Section 
4.
41 
6 6    C Co on nc cl lu us si io on ns s      
Competition policy in Brazil can best be understood as part of a process of market 
liberalization. In the U.S. competition policy became important as a consequence of evolution of 
the market economy. In Brazil it has been an instrument to promote the market economy and its 
institutions. Competition values and culture are already present in mature economies. They are 
still being created and disseminated in developing economies. As a consequence, the positive 
effects of a competition law are not immediate and a learning period is necessary.  
The very existence of antitrust in Brazil was only possible as a result of these liberalizing 
reforms, since there is no role for competition policy in an economy with price controls and 
heavy state intervention in production. In turn, competition policy is essential in promoting 
competitive markets in developing countries, and its introduction is needed in order to face some 
issues of privatization and trade liberalization.  
It is not possible to reproduce the typical competition law of a developed economy in the 
context of a developing economy. As the Brazilian experience suggests, a number of peculiarities 
of developing economies have to be taken into account.  
Finally, although progress has been made in the last ten years, institution building is far 
from complete. Important changes must be made to guarantee greater efficiency, fair procedure 
and autonomy for the antitrust authorities. It will be necessary to contemplate the specific 
characteristics of a developing economy and, most of all, the particular consequences of a large 
informal sector for antitrust analysis. 
 
 
                                                 
41 A special report prepared by Tendências contains a number of concrete suggestions to the project law sent 
to Congress.  
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